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In this reply I address the comment by W-Y. Hwang and O. Gittsovich on my paper [Phys. Rev.
A 82, 032313 (2010)]. The authors of the comment point out that I use implicit assumption that
the alphabet of the eavesdropper is binary. They claim that such assumption is unrealistic. Here I
show that even without this assumption the main result of my paper still holds.
The authors of the comment [2] make an observation
that
PB > PE ⇒ I(A : B) > I(A : E) (1)
holds only if the alphabet of E is binary. This is true
as the example provided in the comment clearly shows.
Since the proof presented in my paper [1] uses this im-
plication in one step it holds only for the attacks of the
adversary with the limited outcome alphabet, which is
not very realistic. However, this problem can be easily
overcome by the slight modification of the proof which I
present below.
We may write the condition
I(A : B) > I(A : E) (2)
as
H(A)− h(PB) > H(A)−
∑
i
pih(P (A = 0|i)) (3)
where h(.) is binary Shannon entropy function and pi is
the probability that Eve’s outcome is i. We may get rid
of the identical terms on the both sides of the inequality
and write it as
h(PB) <
∑
i
pih(P (A = 0|i)). (4)
Let PE|i denote the probability of Eve correctly guess-
ing the Alice’s outcome when her outcome is i. Be-
cause h(P (A = 0|i)) = h(P (A = 1|i)) and PE|i is
just max{P (A = 0|i), P (A = 1|i)}, we may substitute
h(P (A = 0|i)) = h(PE|i). PE is, obviously, equal to the
weighted sum of these probabilities
PE =
∑
i
piPE|i. (5)
Now, we can use the concavity of the binary entropy to
claim that for the given value of PE the smallest value
of
∑
i pih(PE|i) is obtained when the probabilities PE|i
take only the values 12 or 1. If p denote the sum of all pi
such that PE|i = 12 then
PE = 1− 1
2
p (6)
and
∑
i
pih(PE|i) ≥ p = 2(1− PE). (7)
Now, plugging it into (4), one sees that the sufficient
condition to guarantee (2) is
h(PB) < 2(1− PE). (8)
This is how Eq.(11) from my original paper should look
like if the arbitrary alphabet for the adversary is allowed.
Following the same line of reasoning as in the paper one
can obtain the updated version of the general condition
expressed in Eq.(27) which now becomes
h(βT (A,B)) < 3− 4fMT ′ (βT (A,B)). (9)
This new condition implies new critical values of
β(A,B) required for the security of the protocol. They
can be found, just as in [1], by substituting the
monogamy condition for a given theory T ′ for fMT ′ (.) in
(9). For QM monogamy the critical value is 0.841 which
is below the Tsirelson bound (0.854). For NS monogamy
the critical value is 0.881 which again is within the reach
of no-signalling theories as they allow for the values up
to 1 [3].
Just as in [1] the condition (9) can be repre-
sented graphically and the critical values for different
monogamies found as the coordinates of the points where
the line corresponding to this condition intersects the one
corresponding to the given monogamy. The updated ver-
sion of the fig 1. from [1] is presented below.
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FIG. 1: Monogamy relations for different theories are plotted.
The sufficient condition for the security of the key distribution
protocol (9) is described by the line that passes through P .
The intersection of this line with monogamy relation for any
specific theory T gives the critical value of βT (A,B) above
which Alice and Bob can have secure communication. More
explicitly, if A and B estimate their β(A,B) to be greater
than βT (A,B), they can have secure communication against
individual attacks of the eavesdropper who has access to the
resources of theory T. Point P has its horizontal coordinate
equal to the Tsirelson bound, so for any theory T that inter-
sects the sufficient condition line before P , it is possible for
A and B to have a quantum protocol secure against attacks
from T regime. With the unlimited alphabet of the eaves-
dropper QM monogamy still intersects the line corresponding
to the condition 9 before P , which means that the quantum
resources can guarantee the security against the eavesdrop-
per limited by the monogamy resulting from the quantum
theory. However, in contrast with the situation where the
alphabet of the eavesdropper is binary, the same resources
are not enough against the eavesdropper limited only by the
no-signalling condition.
